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Abstract: In this paper we assess whether both the levels and the degree of change in 
government quality influence regional economic performance in the European Union 
(EU) and, in particular, in its lagging regions. The results of the econometric analysis, 
covering 249 NUTS2 regions for the period between 1999 and 2013, suggest that: a) 
government quality matters for regional growth; b) relative improvements in quality of 
government are a powerful driver of development; c) one-size-fits-all policies for 
lagging regions are not the solution; d) government quality improvements are essential 
for low growth regions; and e) in low income regions basic endowment shortages are 
still the main barrier to development. In particular, low growth regions in Southern 
Europe stand to benefit the most from improvements in government quality, while in 
low income regions of Central and Eastern Europe, investments in the traditional drivers 
of growth remain the main factors behind successful economic trajectories. 
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According to the dominant economic theories, economic growth is the result of a 
combination of three factors – physical capital, human capital or labour, and innovation 
– plus a residual factor or error term, which represents what we do not know or cannot 
explain. Depending on whether a neoclassical growth (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) or an 
endogenous growth approach is adopted (Romer, 1986: Lucas, 1988), the weight 
attributed to each of the components varies, but they remain the fundamental drivers 
informing development policies across the world. The European Union’s (EU) regional 
development and cohesion policy has been no exception. The bulk of cohesion 
investments have been channelled towards improving the infrastructure endowment and 
accessibility of the least developed regions of the EU, as well as increasing the 
availability and quality of human resources, and developing the innovative capacity of 
individuals and firms across lagging-behind areas of Europe.  
 
By and large, this sort of intervention has borne fruit, as the performance of lagging 
regions of Europe has outstripped that of the core in recent years (Becker et al., 2010; 
Pellegrini et al., 2013). However, the success of the policy in delivering greater 
economic convergence does not hide the fact that we are witnessing a decline in the 
returns of intervention in the three main growth axes. There is, for example, growing 
concern about a potential exhaustion of additional investments in transport 
infrastructure and of improvements in accessibility as drivers of growth in certain 
lagging regions of Europe (Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). While this issue 
remains controversial, the truth is that physical capital, human capital, and technology 
explain a waning share of the variation in regional economic growth in Europe. Growth 
theories that accounted for differences in economic performance relatively well two 
decades ago are becoming less capable of doing so. The residual factor is growing, 
meaning that, in spite of improvements in growth theory, we tend to know less about 
what determines regional growth in Europe. 
 
This declining explanatory capacity signals that a key factor in the growth equation has 
been missing. Most eyes have turned to the role of institutions, in general, and 
government quality, in particular (Charron et al., 2013). However, measuring 
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institutional quality, especially at the regional level, has been difficult and fraught with 
controversy (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). Despite these problems, strides have been made of 
late in assessing government quality at a regional level in Europe. The biggest 
breakthrough was by the Quality of Government Institute of the University of 
Gothenburg, which has produced a subjective quality of government (QoG) index 
(Charron et al., 2011, 2014a, and 2014b). Numerous studies have turned to the QoG in 
order to explain how regional variations in quality of government contribute to shape 
the economic dynamism of regions in Europe. The large majority of these studies has 
reached the conclusion that government quality matters for economic performance and 
that poor government in lagging areas of Europe represents a significant barrier to 
development. Government quality not only affects economic growth, but also the 
returns of European cohesion policies (Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015), shapes 
regional competitiveness (Annoni and Dijkstra, 2013). Moreover, corrupt and/or 
inefficient governments undermine regional potential for innovation (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Di Cataldo, 2015) and entrepreneurship (Nistotskaya et al., 2015) and weaken the 
attractiveness of regions to migrants (Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015). Regional 
environmental performance (Halkos et al., 2015) and decisions on the type of public 
good investment (Crescenzi et al., 2016) are also affected, as well as the inclusiveness 
and participation in political processes (Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014). 
 
These studies represent substantial progress in our understanding of the role of 
government quality as a shaper of regional growth in lagging areas of Europe, but are 
limited in two respects. First, they consider institutional conditions as a factor affecting 
economic development. Regions have a better or worse endowment of institutions, 
depending, among other factors, on their history (Charron and Lapuente, 2013) and 
quality of government operates in a path dependent way. This perception of institutions 
often implies that government quality remains more or less stable over time, as a 
permanent barrier/enabler to/of economic development. Yet, while institutional 
conditions do persist in time, they also change and, sometimes, change rapidly. Estonia, 
for example, has become in the space of two decades one of the world leaders in the use 
of e-government, greatly improving the overall efficacy, accountability and 
transparency of government. Latvia, by contrast and despite sharing many historical 
traits with Estonia and a comparable starting point, has been unable to undertake similar 
levels of institutional transformation. This potential for institutional change has, 
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nevertheless, been overlooked by the literature, limiting our understanding of how 
change in government quality impacts on economic development. 
 
Second, because of data constraints, most of the above-mentioned analyses on 
government quality have considered a period covering exclusively the boom that 
preceded the 2008 economic crisis. Hence, we know how government quality affects 
economic performance in a period of economic expansion, but we know next to nothing 
about whether the quality of government has a similar effect on regional economic 
performance in periods of deep recession, such as that of post-2008 Europe, or over 
changes in the economic cycle. 
 
This paper addresses these gaps in our knowledge by assessing whether both the levels 
and the degree of change in government quality influence regional economic 
performance in the whole of Europe and, in particular, in lagging regions of the EU. We 
also analyse whether the effect of government quality – and that of the other more 
traditional factors included in growth theories – resists deep changes in the economic 
cycle, such as those experienced by the EU since 2008. In order to do so, we use 
Charron et al.’s (2011; 2014a) regional quality of government dataset in conjunction 
with indicators referring to endowments and investments in accessibility, education and 
training, and innovation. These data are gathered for a total of 249 NUTS2 regions in 
the EU for the period between 1999 and 2013. The aim is to discriminate between the 
role played by traditional areas in development policy intervention, such as 
infrastructure, human capital and innovation, from that of different government quality 
aspects, such as corruption, the rule of law, government effectiveness, and government 
accountability. Particular attention is paid to changes in all these factors, as well as to 
the importance of quality of government for the development of lagging regions of 
Europe. Another differentiating factor from previous studies is that lagging regions are 
not considered as a uniform mass, but are divided, following the European Commission 
(2014), into low income and low growth regions, based on the initial levels of 
development and the economic performance over the period of analysis. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section the theoretical model is presented. 
Section 3 introduces the empirical approach and the data used in the analysis. Section 4 
exposes the results of the econometric analysis, while section 5 discusses the role of 
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government quality and place-sensitive policies for lagging regions in Europe in light of 
the empirical results. A reflection on the capacity to move to a next level of 
development for lagging-behind regions appears in the final section.  
 
2. The theoretical model 
 
The standard neoclassical Solow-Swan growth model with physical and human capital 
(Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956, Mankiw et al., 1992) has for decades informed development 
policies around the world. We use this model and approach as our benchmark 
investigation framework. In this simple model regional output is determined by the 
following production function: 
 Y(t) = F[A(t), K(t), H(t), L(t)]               (1) 
 
where regional output (Y) is broadly the consequence of a technology parameter (A), 
regional physical capital (K), regional human capital (H), and the labour force (L). We 
assume that technological and economic progress are affected by institutional 
parameters reflecting the quality, efficiency, accountability of governments, the 
relevance of corruption in a territory, and the state of the judicial system. From this 
perspective economic growth is constrained by government or social capability, 
meaning that the institutional environment contributes to determine why certain 
development strategies and types of public intervention take hold, and others do not. 
Institutional conditions, such as government quality, affect technical progress, the 
efficiency of investment, and, as a consequence, the responsiveness of output to human 
and physical capital (i.e. infrastructure, property rights, and education – which all tend 
to be sensitive to institutions). Institutional parameters may thus be sub-divided into 
elements focusing on human capital related components and local region-specific legal 
and governmental aspects (Acemoglu and Dell, 2009) both of which influence 
technical, as well as non-technical regional growth parameters.  
 
Taking this into account, we define the technology parameter A(.) as a combination of 
technological know-how – i.e. productive efficiency T(.), which again is determined by 
technology adaption choices of profit-maximising firms, and the presence or quality of 
local and national institutions, I(.), reflected in the provision of public goods and 
services, the availability of a functioning legal system, and the protection of property 
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rights. We can therefore illustrate the technology parameter as a function G[.], of T(.) 
and I(.): 
 A(t) = G[T(. ), I(. )]                  (2) 
 
We develop the traditional Solow-Swan growth framework considering both physical 
and human-capital aspects à la Mankiw et al. (1992), on the one hand, and institutional 
– government quality – regional parameters, on the other. We assume a simple linear 
relationship between T(.) and I(.) and substitute equation (2) into equation (1). Using a 
constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function, the equation (1) is re-
written as follows: 
 
   Y(t) = Kα(t) Hβ(t) [I(. ) T(t) L(t)]1−α−β  (3) 
where I(.) denotes a matrix of institutional measures and T(.) a vector of company-based 
productive efficiency. We further assume that European regions differ in their initial 
technology level (i.e. in technological effectiveness or institutional background) and that 
the overall productive efficiency T(.) is similar across all territories (Mankiw et al., 
1992). By computing steady-state values of human and physical capital per effective 
unit of labour (3) and taking natural logarithms, the following structural equation for a 
region’s long-run income per capita levels can be derived (cf. Mankiw et al., 1992):
  
 
 ln [Y(t)L(t)] = lnT(0) + gt + lnI(0) − α+β1−α−β ln(nt + g + δ) + α1−α−β ln(sk) + β1−α−β ln(sh)   (4) 
 
where Y(t)/L(t) denotes regional GDP per capita, sk,t regional savings or investment, sh,t 
human capital accumulation, nit regional population growth, g the exogenous 
technology growth rate, and δ the rate of depreciation. The model predicts higher real 
income in territories with higher savings- (i.e. investment-) rates, a higher level of 
innovative capacity, technological progress, and better institutional conditions.  
 
 
3. Empirical approach 
 




The empirical methodology is based on the extended neoclassical Solow-Swan-type 
estimation model presented in the previous section, distinguishing between different 
indicators of a region’s physical accessibility, human-capital and innovation-related 
regional factors, as well as between several different measures of a region’s government 
quality.  
  
To control for potentially omitted variables and reduce endogeneity concerns, due to 
reverse causality or simultaneity, we introduce all independent variables with a five-
year lag. The use of a five-year lag responds to the expectations that the types of capital 
investment associated with regional development policies, in general, and European 
Cohesion policies, in particular – improvements in accessibility, education and training, 
and science and technology investments – are likely to leave a long-lasting impact 
which goes well beyond short-term Keynesian-type multiplier effects. Government 
quality also shows a large degree of persistence and path dependence (Charron and 
Lapuente, 2013; Charron et al., 2014). In addition, we provide further empirical results 
by resorting to a heteroscedasticity-robust system ‘Generalized Method of Moments’ 
(GMM) estimator (Roodman, 2009) which, in theory, addresses potential endogeneity 
issues.  
 
The empirical model accounts for physical and human capital, as well as for different 
levels of innovative capacity and regional institutional quality. It adopts the following 
form: 
 ln(yi,t) − ln(yi,t−1) = β0 + β1ln (yi,t−5) +β2ln (investmenti,t−5) + β3ln (human_captiali,t−5) + β4ln(institutioni,t−5) + β5ln (ni,t−5 + g + δ) + ɣi + υt + εi,t      (5) 
 
 
where the index i represents the region with i ℮ [1, 249] and t denotes a time index in a 
sample covering the period 1999-2013. Real GDP per capita (in PPS) of NUTS-2 region 
i at time t is denoted by yi,t. Regional physical capital (i.e. investmenti,t-1) is measured by 
the level of gross fixed capital formation (in % of nominal GDP). We further 
decompose the investment variable into a more general indicator of a region’s physical 




The human capital parameter (human_capitali,t-1) represents regional education levels, 
proxied by the share of people in employment with tertiary education. ni,t-1 denotes 
population growth rate in the region, while g and δ reflect technological progress and 
capital depreciation, which we assume to be constant over time and to jointly add up to 
a value of 5% (cf. Mankiw et al., 1992).  
 
Institutions at a regional level and their change are proxied by Charron’s et al. (2011; 
2014a; 2014b) index of regional quality of government.1 The regional government 
quality index is decomposed into its four constituent components which include (i) 
corruption, (ii) rule of law, (iii) government effectiveness and bureaucracy, and (iv) 
government accountability. The empirical model (5) has regional fixed effects (ɣi) and 
annual time fixed effects (υt) as a means to control for regional or time-specific 
characteristics. εi,t represents the idiosyncratic error term.  
 
The estimated standard growth model of equation (5) is further extended by including 
the level and changes of innovation, education and investment-related indices, 
combining several potential economic growth indicators by means of principal 
component analysis. Principal component analysis can be used to account for potential 
multicollinearity issues when simultaneously introducing certain potentially correlated 
explanatory variables.2 Different regressors are merged into one composite index, 
allowing us to preserve “as much as possible of the variability of the original indicators” 
(Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012: 57). The resulting augmented Solow-Swan-type 
growth model adopts the following form: 
 
                                                     
1 Data availability limits the analysis to the use of mostly formal institutions – although corruption levels 
are also included – of government quality. Another interesting strand of research would be to consider the 
role played by informal institutions, such as social capital, trust or shared values (see, for instance, the 
work of Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik, 2005 or Akçomak and Ter Weel 2009). This, however, would goes 
beyond the scope of the paper and would require a separate analysis. 
 
2 Potential drawbacks of principal component analysis include relying on linear assumptions and on 




ln(yi,t) − ln(yi,t−1) = β0 + β1ln (yi,t−5)    +β2ln (investment)i,t−5  + β3ln (accessibility index)_level and growthi,t−5 + β3ln (human capital and innovation index)_level and growthi,t−5 +β4ln(institutions)_level and growthi,t−5 +  β5ln (ni,t−5 + g + δ) + ɣi + υt + εi,t    (6) 
 
where all parameters are defined as above and the three composite indices account for 
the stock and improvements in regional accessibility, as well as for the level and change 
in educational and innovation-related regional attributes. The accessibility index is built 
combining road network data, measuring potential road accessibility as the inverse 
time-distance weighted population3 with the ratio of air transport passengers over 
regional population, using principal component analysis.  
  
In order to benchmark the determinants of economic growth in lagging regions relative 
to the drivers of growth in the EU as a whole, we estimate growth models for the EU as 
a whole, as well as for different types of lagging regions – low growth and low income. 
The distinction between low growth and low income regions was established by the 
European Commission in the 6th Cohesion Report (2014). In it, for the first time, the 
considerable heterogeneity of lagging-behind regions in Europe was brought to the fore. 
In particular, the different trajectories of regions in the economic periphery of Europe 
that, despite remaining very poor, had grown over the period between 2000 and 2013 
well above the European average (low income regions) and those that, although starting 
from a higher level of development, had failed to converge (low growth regions) 
(Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Low income and low growth regions in Europe. 
 
                                                     
3 The road accessibility data are based on road network data for the years 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2014, 
with the remaining years being extrapolated or interpolated. The raw data were gathered by Klaus 
Spiekermann and provided by Lewis Dijkstra in the European Commission. The distance decay function 




 Source: European Commission. 
  
 3.2 Data 
 
The exact definitions of the variables introduced and data sources used in the empirical 
analysis are summarized in Table A1 in the Annex. The descriptive statistics and 
correlation matrix are presented in Tables A2a and A2b, while Table A3 contains the 
correlation and eigenvector results of the principal component analysis. The aim of this 
section is to highlight some of the most important characteristics of the dataset. The 
analysis is based on regional NUTS-2 level4 data covering the whole of the EU during 
                                                     
4 Nomenclature of Territorial Unit for Statistics (NUTS) as defined by the European Commission. 
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the period between 1995 and 20013 (1995-2009 for the independent variables, 1999-
2013 for the dependent variable: regional economic growth). For countries without 
regional subdivisions at NUTS-2 level (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Luxembourg) 
country-wide statistics were used. Data for a total of 256 regions in 24 EU countries 
was gathered. Some individual regions and countries were excluded due inadequate data 
availability or as a consequence of recent changes in NUTS-2 boundaries.5 This left a 
dataset with complete data for a total of 249 regions. With the exception of the 
government quality parameters, the source for all variables is Eurostat’s Regio database.   
The government quality variables stem from Charron et al.’s (2014a) quality of 
government (QoG) index. This index is constructed by combining the World Bank’s 
country-level ‘World Governance Indicators’ (WGI) (Kaufmann et al., 2009) with an 
EU-wide regional survey based on approximately 34,000 EU citizens.6 The survey 
includes 16 questions aimed at evaluating the citizens’ experience and perception of the 
local institutional quality (Charron et al., 2011). The questions focus on three general 
public services that are administered or financed in a considerable number of countries 
at a regional (i.e. sub-national) level: education, health care, and law enforcement. 
Rating these services with respect to their quality, impartiality, and the presence of 
corruption, the respondents assigned different scores to each of the 16 questions. The 
responses were then aggregated from the individual to the regional level and also to the 
national level. The 16 regional scores were classified into four subgroups identifying 
citizens’ perception of (i) the prevalence of corruption, (ii) the rule of law, (iii) regional 
government, and (iv) the strength of democracy and electoral institutions (voice and 
accountability). The scores were standardized and the regional value subtracted from the 
national score. This provided a regional distance to the national score in standard 
deviations. The regional distance was subsequently standardised at the EU level using 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
5 Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, and Malta had to be excluded from the analysis due to missing data. 
Additionally, some individual regions were not included in the analysis for the same reasons. These 
comprise Ceuta and Melilla, all French overseas departments (Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane, 
Réunion), Açores and Madeira, and North Eastern Scotland and the Highlands and Islands. Recent 
changes in NUTS-2 boundaries led to the exclusion of the Finnish regions of Helsinki-Uusimaa, Etelä-
Suomi, Pohjois-Suomi, and Itä-Suomi. 
  
6 The survey – one of the largest ever conducted at a regional (i.e. subnational) level – is based on around 
200 participants per region and consisted of 34 quality of government-, and demography-related 
questions, amongst others on education, health care, and law enforcement. For more detailed information 




the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) time series. Finally, all four 
individual components were merged into a composite measure of quality of 
government: the quality of government index (QoG). A series of robustness tests were 
conducted by Charron et al. (2014a), showing that the quality of government index is 
highly robust to changes in weighting and aggregation, as well as to the social and age-
related composition of the survey respondents.  
4. Estimation of results 
 
4.1 Results for the whole of the EU 
 
Table 1 presents the fixed effects estimations for the 249 EU regions included in the 
analysis, highlighting the decomposition of the quality of government index into its four 
main constituents: corruption (regression 2), rule of law (regression 3), government 
effectiveness (regression 4), and government accountability (regression 5).  
 
The results of the analysis underline that some of the factors that explain change in 
regional economic growth in Europe over the last two decades are in line with the 
predictions of the neoclassical growth theory. The negative and highly significant 
coefficient of the initial GDP per capita indicator points to a considerable regional 
catch-up between 1999 and 2013. Although the crisis has hit the low growth income 
regions of southern Europe particularly hard, their divergence since 2008 has been more 
than compensated by a faster growth in the economic periphery than in the core between 
1999 and 2008 and by the relatively resilient performance of many of the low income 
regions of Central and Eastern Europe since the inception of the crisis (Cuadrado-Roura 
et al., 2016). Lagged regional population growth rates are also negatively and 




Table 1. The drivers of growth – levels and change – at a regional level in the EU 
(1999-2013). Fixed effects estimation. 
  Fixed effects analysis  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Initial GDP per capita -0.107*** -0.110*** -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.103*** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Investment -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016** -0.015** -0.016*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Population growth -0.308* -0.328** -0.296* -0.262 -0.344** 
 
(0.165) (0.159) (0.163) (0.164) (0.164) 
Agglomeration 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Level of accessibility index -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.108*** -0.100*** 
 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
Change of accessibility index -0.151 -0.120 -0.099 -0.149 -0.151 
 
(0.093) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.094) 
Level of human capital & innovation index 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.010 0.011 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Change of human capital & innovation index -0.024* -0.023* -0.023* -0.027** -0.022* 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Level of institutional quality (QoG) 0.007 
    
 
(0.062) 
    
Change of institutional quality (QoG) 0.227** 
    
 
(0.088)     
Institutional index components      
   Level of corruption index  -0.021    
 
 (0.053)    
   Change of corruption index  0.195***    
 
 (0.053)    
   Level of rule of law index   0.030   
 
  (0.046)   
   Change of rule of law index   -0.310***   
 
  (0.081)   
   Level of government effectiveness    0.002  
 
   (0.038)  
   Change of government effectiveness    0.158***  
 
   (0.038)  
   Level of government accountability     0.056 
 
    (0.035) 
   Change of government accountability     0.059* 
 
    (0.032) 
Constant 2.399*** 2.505*** 2.396*** 2.444*** 2.138*** 
 
(0.431) (0.443) (0.428) (0.432) (0.444) 
Observations 2,802 2,802 2,802 2,801 2,802 
Number of regions 249 249 249 249 249 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 within 0.555 0.556 0.560 0.556 0.556 
R2 between 0.0917 0.0946 0.0773 0.0884 0.0862 
R2 overall 0.0846 0.0833 0.0779 0.0817 0.0912 
Notes: *,**,*** illustrate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% , respectively. The standard errors are listed in parentheses. 
 Investment is proxied by regional gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP. All independent variables are 
included with a five year lag. Natural logarithms have been taken for most regressors apart from the population growth 
variable. All regressions include constant time dummies. 
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The more interesting results relate, however, to the factors that are traditionally most 
consistently associated with economic dynamism. Neither levels of investment, nor the 
accessibility of a region display any positive association with regional economic growth 
in Europe. Productive capital stock investments have a negative and significant 
coefficient (Table 1). The coefficient for road accessibility is also negative and strongly 
significant. Hence, a good accessibility – the aim of a considerable proportion of the 
European Cohesion effort until now – has not contributed to a noticeable rise in 
economic growth in recent years. The coefficient for the level of human capital and 
innovation is insignificant, as is that of the government quality indicator, the 
independent variable of interest (Table 1). This result contrasts with previous studies 
using pre/crisis data (Nistotskaya et al., 2015; Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015) and implies that, when considering a period of 
time that involves pre-and post-crisis performance, regional quality of government may 
have less of an influence on economic outcomes. Hence, in a period dominated by a 
radical alteration in regional growth patterns following the inception of the crisis, better 
or worse regional endowments in the factors that, according to standard economic 
theory, are likely to have a greater sway of regional growth, do not seem to have played 
an important role in determining regional growth trajectories (Table 1). 
 
Does this also apply to changes in these factors? Have improvements in accessibility, 
human capital and innovation, and government quality made a difference for the 
performance of European regions during the period of analysis? The coefficients for 
improvements in accessibility – which may require a longer timeframe than that 
afforded by the analysis to be properly assessed – show no significant connection to 
economic growth. Increases in the human capital and innovation effort are, by contrast, 
negatively and significantly related to economic growth (Table 1). Given these results, 
changes in the three fundamental growth theory factors do not seem to have shaped 
regional economic performance in a Europe characterised by a strong boom and bust 
cycle. 
 
This does not apply, however, for changes in the regional quality of government. The 
coefficient for change in the composite government quality index is positive and 
significant at the 1% level (Table 1, regression 1). Similarly, improvements in three of 
the four dimensions of regional government quality – control of corruption, government 
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effectiveness, and accountability – are positively and significantly associated with 
economic growth (Table 1, regressions 2, 4, 5). Improvements in the rule of law, in 
contrast, show a negative and significant connection with regional growth. It can 
therefore be inferred that a weak government quality has not represented a significant 
barrier for economic growth during the period of analysis. All coefficients for the 
variables depicting the levels of government quality are insignificant (Table 3, 
regression 2). By contrast, reducing corruption and improving government effectiveness 
and accountability have been crucial in determining which regions have performed 
better and which worse in recent years. 
 
These results for the quality of government variables are confirmed when the method of 
estimation is changed. Table A4 in the Annex presents the same analysis as in Table 1 
using heteroscedasticity-robust System-GMM estimation techniques in all regressions.7 
A system-GMM dynamic panel data estimation was used not only as a robustness check 
of the results of the fixed effects analyses, but also to control for potential endogeneity. 
 
4.2 Lagging regions in the EU 
The previous analysis has looked at the role played by quality of government and the 
traditional factors behind economic growth (according to theory) in determining the 
economic performance of European regions between 1999 and 2013. But what happens 
when we focus exclusively on lagging regions? Do lagging regions benefit in the same 
way as the average European region from change in quality of government? Tables 2 
and 3 present the results of applying model (6) to the two subsets of less-developed 
regions identified by the European Commission (2014): the low growth regions of 
southern Europe and the low income regions of Eastern Europe.  
 
4.2.1. Low growth regions 
 
The results indicate that in low growth regions, the 2000s and early 2010s have been 
characterised by territorial convergence within the group. Greater investment has been 
associated with lower levels of growth, while the population growth rate is disconnected 
                                                     
7 All independent variables were classified as endogenous in all regressions and the fourth and third lag 
were employed as (internal) instruments for the endogenous variables.  
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from economic performance. Population agglomeration, by contrast, has been a strong 
factor behind the economic dynamism of these areas. A good initial accessibility as well 
as improvements in accessibility – on which the EU has invested the bulk of its 
Cohesion funds in these regions – have been more often than not a drag for their 
performance, as virtually all the coefficients are negative and significant (Table 2, 
regressions 1. 2, 4, and 5). And while progress in human capital and innovation are not 
associated to regional economic growth, initial endowments in this index have been 
essential for good economic performance in this subset of lagging-behind regions.  
 
There are also important changes concerning government quality. Seven of the ten 
government quality variables – level of corruption, change in the rule of law and the 
degree of government accountability being the exceptions – are statistically significant, 
denoting the important role played by this type of institution in shaping recent economic 
performance in the lagging regions of southern Europe. The sign of the coefficients also 
indicates that a poor quality of government has not necessarily been an insurmountable 
barrier for the economic performance of these regions. Regions with a weaker 
government quality, and, in particular, those with a less efficient judicial system and 
less effective governments have outperformed those with better initial levels of 
institutional quality (Table 1, regressions 1, 2, 3, and 4). Relative improvements in 
government quality have also been fundamental channels to increase economic 
performance. Regions which have experienced the greatest advances in overall quality 
of government and, specifically, in reducing corruption and increasing government 
effectiveness and accountability have had a better economic trajectory. Those that, by 
contrast, have seen a deterioration of their institutional quality – as in the case of most 
of Italy or northern France – have witnessed a rise of discontent and frustration with 
local institutions which, at times, has been translated into an increase in votes for anti-





Table 2. The drivers of growth – levels and change – in low growth regions of the EU 
(1999-2013). Fixed effects estimation. 
  Fixed effects analysis  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Initial GDP per capita -0.224*** -0.218*** -0.276*** -0.259*** -0.179*** 
 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.044) (0.045) (0.039) 
Investment -0.037** -0.029* -0.033* -0.043** -0.025* 
 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) 
Population growth 0.078 0.130 -0.576 0.142 0.044 
 
(0.705) (0.701) (0.627) (0.696) (0.624) 
Agglomeration 0.172*** 0.191*** 0.155*** 0.138** 0.162*** 
 (0.047) (0.058) (0.045) (0.054) (0.046) 
Level of accessibility index -0.065** -0.125*** -0.024 -0.067* -0.100*** 
 
(0.030) (0.034) (0.042) (0.035) (0.031) 
Change of accessibility index -0.438*** -0.229* -0.150 -0.437*** -0.296*** 
 
(0.100) (0.128) (0.126) (0.107) (0.087) 
Level of human capital & innovation index 0.095*** 0.069* 0.087** 0.095** 0.074** 
 
(0.032) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) 
Change of human capital & innovation index -0.020 -0.009 -0.017 -0.014 -0.011 
 
(0.037) (0.042) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) 
Level of institutional quality (QoG) -1.117***     
 
(0.193)     
Change of institutional quality (QoG) 0.792***     
 
(0.171)     
Institutional index components      
   Level of corruption index  0.013    
 
 (0.116)    
   Change of corruption index  0.281***    
 
 (0.090)    
   Level of rule of law index   -0.792***   
 
  (0.184)   
   Change of rule of law index   -0.103   
 
  (0.073)   
   Level of government effectiveness    -0.621***  
 
   (0.16)  
   Change of government effectiveness    0.231**  
 
   (0.096)  
   Level of government accountability     -0.233 
 
    (0.147) 
   Change of government accountability     0.795*** 
 
    (0.117) 
Constant 3.124*** 1.222** 2.603*** 2.778*** 1.401*** 
 
(0.686) (0.556) (0.680) (0.791) (0.466) 
Observations 347 347 347 347 347 
Number of regions 27 27 27 27 27 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 within 0.589 0.562 0.603 0.578 0.600 
R2 between 0.014 0.044 0.002 0.024 0.017 
R2 overall 0.015 0.049 0.0280 0.031 0.054 
Notes: *,**,*** illustrate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% , respectively. The standard errors are listed in parentheses. 
 Investment is proxied by regional gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP. All independent variables are 
included with a five year lag. Natural logarithms have been taken for most regressors apart from the population growth 
variable. All regressions include constant time dummies. 




Hence, the results indicate that in the low growth regions of Europe government quality 
is a powerful catalyst of economic growth, as well as a mechanism to stem economic 
decline. Unfavourable government quality conditions have not deterred growth, while 
progress in government quality has been central in determining which regions have 
been able to surf better the boom and bust cycle of the last few years. 
4.2.2. Low income regions 
Do the low income regions of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania behave in the 
same way? Table 3 reproduces the same analysis for the 19 officially designated low 
income regions. The results differ considerably from those of the low growth regions 
group. The only constant is the presence of convergence within the group. In the case of 
low income regions, economic performance in recent years has been boosted by the 
sorts of interventions which have been at the heart of European Cohesion Policy. 
Regions with a better endowment of human capital and innovation capacity and those 
which have witnessed a larger relative progress in accessibility have performed 




Table 3. The drivers of growth – levels and change – in low income regions of the EU 
(1999-2013). Fixed effects estimation. 
  Fixed effects analysis  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Initial GDP per capita -0.265*** -0.287*** -0.312*** -0.265*** -0.273*** 
 
(0.044) (0.042) (0.050) (0.049) (0.043) 
Investment 0.006 -0.003 0.012 -0.006 0.005 
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) 
Population growth 0.166 0.162 0.204 0.0683 0.610** 
 
(0.337) (0.355) (0.288) (0.371) (0.264) 
Agglomeration 0.211** 0.307** 0.195* 0.299** 0.158 
 (0.0902) (0.111) (0.100) (0.116) (0.135) 
Level of accessibility index -0.602*** -0.600*** -0.613*** -0.560*** -0.581*** 
 
(0.124) (0.133) (0.127) (0.115) (0.115) 
Change of accessibility index 0.746*** 0.808*** 0.673** 0.765*** 0.706*** 
 
(0.238) (0.246) (0.268) (0.223) (0.224) 
Level of human capital & innovation index 0.088** 0.097** 0.073** 0.099*** 0.0740** 
 
(0.034) (0.036) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031) 
Change of human capital & innovation index -0.038 -0.045 -0.040 -0.043 -0.010 
 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.047) (0.040) (0.043) 
Level of institutional quality (QoG) -0.387* 
    
 
(0.211) 
    
Change of institutional quality (QoG) -0.129 
    
 
(0.311) 
    
Institutional index components      
   Level of corruption index  -0.109    
 
 (0.175)    
   Change of corruption index  0.038    
 
 (0.185)    
   Level of rule of law index   -0.571***   
 
  (0.169)   
   Change of rule of law index   0.065   
 
  (0.291)   
   Level of government effectiveness    -0.185  
 
   (0.223)  
   Change of government effectiveness    -0.135  
 
   (0.165)  
   Level of government accountability     -0.426*** 
 
    (0.142) 
   Change of government accountability     0.0587 
 
    (0.182) 
Constant 8.585*** 6.951*** 9.806*** 6.449*** 9.145*** 
 
(2.054) (1.919) (1.879) (2.055) (2.314) 
Observations 244 244 244 244 244 
Number of regions 19 19 19 19 19 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 within 0.637 0.629 0.651 0.631 0.650 
R2 between 0.102 0.135 0.108 0.144 0.156 
R2 overall 0.0876 0.108 0.0755 0.113 0.0966 
Notes: *,**,*** illustrate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% , respectively, respectively. The standard errors are listed in 
parentheses. 
 Investment is proxied by regional gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP. All independent variables are 
included with a five year lag. Natural logarithms have been taken for most regressors apart from the population growth 




In contrast, none of the quality of government variables displays a positive and 
significant relationship with economic growth during the period of analysis. Only for 
the case of the levels of rule of law and government accountability a significant 
connection to economic performance emerges. The sign of the coefficient is, 
nevertheless, negative (Table 3, regressions 3 and 5). Hence, while for the low growth 
regions of Southern Europe economic performance has been strongly related to change 
in government quality, growth in the low income regions of Central and Eastern Europe 
is much more dependent on the traditional factors, according to growth theories, behind 
economic change. It can therefore be said that, while in low income regions investing in 
redressing the imbalance in endowments with the rest of Europe makes sense from an 
economic point of view, in the low growth regions – which have benefited from this 
type of investment throughout the life of the Structural and Cohesion funds and where, 
as a consequence, the gap in basic endowments is considerably lower – the capacity to 
generate growth and weather economic crises has become much more dependent on 
improving the institutional conditions which act as a barrier for economic development. 
 
5. Government quality and place-sensitive policies for lagging 
regions in Europe.  
 
What are the implications for policy that can be extracted from the analysis? Although 
measuring government quality is always controversial and leads to some caution when 
interpreting the results, a number of important policy consequences can be derived. 
 
5.1. Institutions matter 
 
The first implication of the analysis is that quality of government matters for regional 
development in Europe. Over a period which includes economic boom, as well as the 
greatest and most prolonged economic depression Europe has experienced since the 
1930s, government quality has been among the most consistent predictors of economic 
growth and resilience. This contrasts with more mixed results in the sway of education 
and innovation and with what is a lack of connection – when not an outright negative 
one – between levels and improvements in accessibility, on the one hand, and economic 
performance, on the other, for the whole of Europe. This implies that, in order for 
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economic development at a regional level in Europe to take hold, measures to improve 
government quality need to become an integral part of any development strategy. 
 
5.2. Relative improvements in quality of government are a powerful driver of 
development 
 
In particular, relative improvements in government quality have been fundamental for 
economic growth. Whereas poor government quality has not represented a barrier for 
development – indeed, regions that are characterised by weak government institutions 
have, once other factors are controlled for, converged towards the EU average – regions 
that have managed to reduce corruption levels and have made progress in government 
effectiveness, transparency and accountability have also had a better economic 
trajectory. 
 
Consequently, improving government efficiency by either addressing widespread 
corruption or introducing measures aimed at making government decisions more 
efficient and transparent is as important a requisite for regional development in Europe, 
as conducting more traditional ‘hard’ types of regional development investments. 
Overall, the implementation of government efficiency-enhancing measures and the fight 
against corruption can lead to significant progress in the efficiency of public policies 
while, at the same time, reducing wastage in the overall use of scarce public resources 
(Afonso and Fernandes, 2006).  But, as noted by Tanzi (1998: 587), any strategy in this 
respect has to start by an awareness and an acknowledgement that these factors are a 
problem and a significant barrier for public policies to take hold and for economic 
development intervention to take off.  
 
5.3. One-size-fits-all policies for lagging regions are not the solution 
 
Acknowledging the importance of quality of government and implementing the 
necessary steps to improve government quality, however, does not necessarily mean 
that the same policies targeting institutions have to be adopted across lagging regions of 
the EU. The results of the analysis make clear that what has worked in certain lagging 
regions, does not necessarily work in others. Mimetically reproducing the same style of 
policy across the less developed regions of Europe has not yielded the expected results 
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in the past and is unlikely to do so in future. Consequently, different development 
strategies are needed in different places and at different stages of development. The 
empirical analysis has shown that, at lower levels of development, such as those found 
in the low income regions of Central and Eastern Europe, the factors behind economic 
growth in recent years differ from those at higher levels of development and, more 
strikingly, from those of other lagging regions in Southern Europe. At lower levels of 
development, regional economic growth is driven by a good endowment of human 
capital and innovation, as well as by improvements in accessibility through investment 
in transport infrastructure. This implies that the traditional factors highlighted by the 
neoclassical and endogenous growth theories still play a fundamental part in driving 
economic performance in these areas.  
 
As the level of initial development increases, regions hit a middle-income trap 
(Iammarino et al., 2018) and the influence of more traditional growth factors wanes. 
Hence, in the low growth regions of Southern Europe government quality becomes 
more relevant in determining which territories are and remain dynamic and which are 
not.  
 
Consequently, the story emerging is one in which development strategies need to be 
specifically tailored to the conditions of every territory – that is, the implementation of 
place-sensitive policies – which will, to a great extent, depend on the stage of 
development in which any given European region finds itself. Therefore, while 
investments aimed at improving physical accessibility may play an important role in the 
early stages of implementation of a development strategy in the most lagging regions of 
Europe, the returns of such investments are bound to become less evident – and in many 
cases represent a waste of scarce public resources – in those areas that have already 
devoted substantial funds to the improvement of their transportation network through 
the Structural and Investment Funds, unless accompanied by significant progress in 
government quality (Crescenzi et al., 2016).  
 
5.4. Quality of government change as essential for low growth regions  
 
The analysis has evidenced that low government capacity in lagging regions of Europe 
does not necessarily represent a strong handicap for future development. Lack of 
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improvement in government quality, by contrast, does. Low growth regions which have 
failed to improve government quality or have failed to reduce corruption, have been 
incapable of making the most of cohesion policy intervention and, as a consequence, 
have also grown less and been more exposed to the negative consequences of the crisis. 
These results corroborate Charron et al.’s (2014a: 81) claim that failure to address these 
institutional malfunctions condemns regions “to remain stuck in low growth and low 
QoG equilibrium, while the regional government remains to some degree sheltered from 
the financial consequences of low QoG through continuing support from the EU”. A 
sustained effort in order to address barriers in terms of government effectiveness, 
corruption, and deficient voice and accountability is therefore needed if the low growth 
regions are to experience both sustainable levels of development and greater 
convergence towards the rest of the EU.  
 
5.5. Addressing basic endowments shortages in low income regions 
 
In contrast, in the low income regions of Europe more traditional factors, such as a good 
human capital and innovation endowment and investments targeting improved 
accessibility are proving their worth as catalysts for growth. In these areas of Europe, 
strategic investments in infrastructure, in general, and in transport infrastructure, in 
particular, are likely to continue to contribute to economic development for some time. 
With still considerable deficits in basic infrastructure, improving accessibility in low 
income regions becomes a precondition for economic development. Tackling the 
infrastructure deficit thus needs to feature prominently in the early stages of the 
strategy. However, it has to be noted that the returns of improvements in accessibility 
are likely to diminish as accessibility constraints become less important. Consequently, 
any sort of infrastructure investment needs to be limited in time, respond to clear criteria 
of need and development potential, and be matched by similar efforts aimed at the 
enhancement of human capital and at tackling institutional bottlenecks. 
 
6. Conclusion: moving to the next level 
 
The analysis developed in this paper has stressed that for most lagging regions in 
Europe moving to the next level in economic development terms will not be easy unless 
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carefully tailored development strategies are set up paying special attention to the 
specific conditions of each region. If development strategies are to be both capable of 
successfully addressing short-term problems, as well as of putting European lagging 
regions on a sustainable development track in the medium- to long-term, decision-
makers in every European region, nation as well as in Brussels will have to collaborate 
and to tread carefully in crafting development strategies that juggle the traditional 
investments aimed at improving infrastructure, human resources, and innovation with a 
greater focus on institutional issues, such as local government quality as a way to 
overcome the barriers to development that lagging regions face.  
 
The policy lessons that emerge from the analysis point towards the need to carefully put 
together integrated and balanced development strategies in any development policy 
interventions. Development strategies would require encompassing an adequate mix of 
actions aimed at redressing regional infrastructure deficits, together with the active 
improvement of human resources and employment structures, and the upgrading of the 
institutional environment. The mix of all these interventions will vary from place to 
place, depending on initial conditions and levels of development. The timing of each 
action is also crucial. Invest too early, for too long, or too much on one of these 
development axes and the risk of ending up with a strategy that yields scarce returns is 
high. Under these circumstances institutional conditions are likely to become a more 
important and visible barrier to development. Comprehensive and well-timed place-
sensitive development strategies are needed not only address some of the basic 
problems of lagging regions in Europe, but also to enhance their capacity – and, as a 
consequence, that of Europe as a whole – to adopt new technologies, retain and attract 
talent, generate and simulate new investment, and, last but not least, make the most of 
the economic potential across the whole of Europe. Such an approach is also bound to 
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Table A1. Description of Variables 
  
Variable Exact definition Data source 
Dependent variable Annual growth rate of regional GDP (PPS) per capita 
Eurostat' Regio 
Database  
Investment and Infrastructure 
   Gross fixed capital formation 




   Accessibility by road  
Road network data measuring potential road 
accessibility as the inverse time-distance weighted 
population 
Klaus Spiekermann and 
European Commission 
   Accessibility by air 
Total number of air transport passengers in thousand 
standardized by regional population size 
Eurostat' Regio 
Database  
Human capital, innovation and demography 
   Tertiary education   
employment 
Percentage of employed people (aged 25-64) with 
completed higher education (ISCED-97 levels 5 and 6). 
Eurostat' Regio 
Database  
   Life-long-learning ratio 
Participation of adults aged 25-64 in education and 
training in per cent. 
Eurostat' Regio 
Database  
    Patent applications 




   Total R&D expenditure 




   Population growth rate Annual growth rate of the total regional population 
Eurostat' Regio 
Database  
  Agglomeration Average population living within a 25km radius European Commission 
Regional institutional measures 
   Control of corruption 
Index evaluating corruption in the public school and 
health care system, and other public services 
Charron et al. (2014a) 
   Rule of law 
Constructed index measuring residents’ perception of 
the objectivity and confidence in the police and in 
regional law enforcement 
Charron et al. (2014a) 
   Government effectiveness  
Index measure identifying the quality and impartiality 
of regional health care and education services 
Charron et al. (2014a) 
   Government accountability 
Composite index analysing the perceived honesty of 
elections and the effectiveness of the media as a 
watchdog for public sector corruption 
Charron et al. (2014a) 
   Quality of Government Index 
Regional quality of government index constructed 
combining all the previous four indicators 





Table A2a. Descriptive statistics 
  
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita 
3544 .03 .046 -.169 .237 
GDP per capita 3798 22000.2 9070.748 3400 86400 
Gross fixed capital formation 3645 .208 .161 -.105 4.754 
Population growth rate 3556 .003 .007 -.052 .045 
Agglomeration 3765 698000 910000 18807.7 8060000 
Accessibility by air 3810 .002 .003 0 .032 
Accessibility by road 3765 2840000 1970000 79465.95 8860000 
Tertiary education employment 3748 24.669 8.997 6.2 60.2 
Life-long-learning  3810 8.627 7.044 .13 33.71 
Total R&D expenditure 3466 1.329 1.227 .02 13.73 
Patent applications 3810 83.247 110.568 0 996.579 
Quality of Government Index 3810 10.228 .967 6.706 11.623 
Control of corruption 3810 10.227 .936 6.62 11.8 
Rule of law 3810 10.223 .951 6.33 13.362 
Government effectiveness 3810 10.215 1.088 6.518 12.02 
Government accountability 3810 10.182 .946 2.991 13.109 
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Table A2b. Correlation matrix 
  
 Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
(1)  Annual growth rate of GDP per capita 1.000 
(2) GDP per capita -0.128 1.000 
(3) Gross fixed capital formation 0.053 -0.078 1.000 
(4) Population growth rate -0.202 0.391 -0.013 1.000 
(5) Agglomeration -0.035 0.445 -0.077 0.148 1.000 
(6) Accessibility by air -0.103 0.259 -0.013 0.348 0.236 1.000 
(7) Accessibility by road -0.089 0.553 -0.125 0.128 0.594 0.016 1.000 
(8) Tertiary education  employment -0.089 0.478 0.016 0.175 0.430 0.171 0.406 1.000 
(9) Life-long-learning  -0.184 0.423 -0.095 0.189 0.207 0.118 0.216 0.463 1.000 
(10) Total R&D expenditure -0.049 0.454 -0.057 0.167 0.285 0.093 0.420 0.471 0.398 1.000 
(11) Patent applications -0.051 0.505 -0.088 0.116 0.206 0.066 0.548 0.307 0.258 0.650 1.000 
(12) Quality of Government Index -0.144 0.535 -0.058 0.283 0.091 0.096 0.403 0.411 0.526 0.433 0.476 1.000 
(13) Control of corruption -0.152 0.539 -0.077 0.261 0.106 0.101 0.425 0.406 0.545 0.448 0.547 0.957 1.000 
(14) Rule of law -0.151 0.505 -0.062 0.267 0.075 0.114 0.355 0.367 0.506 0.416 0.457 0.970 0.920 1.000 
(15) Government effectiveness -0.113 0.489 -0.034 0.279 0.106 0.086 0.380 0.441 0.483 0.412 0.398 0.959 0.868 0.911 1.000 









Principal components/correlation                     Number of obs     =      3765 
                                                      Number of comp. =         2 
                                                      Trace             =         2 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)                Rho               =    1.0000 
 
Component  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1  1.04406 .0881158 0.5220 0.5220 
Comp2  .955942 . 0.4780 1.0000 
Principal components (eigenvectors)  
 
Variable  Comp1 Comp2 Unexplained 
Accessibility by air  0.7071 0.7071 0 
Accessibility by road  0.7071 -0.7071 0 
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Principal components/correlation                     Number of obs     =      3404 
                                                      Number of comp. =         4 
                                                      Trace             =         4 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)                Rho               =    1.0000 
 
Component  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1  2.31213 1.47238 0.5780 0.5780 
Comp2  .839757 .30852 0.2099 0.7880 
Comp3  .531237 .214366 0.1328 0.9208 
Comp4  .316871 . 0.0792 1.0000 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors)  
 
Variable  Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Unexplained 
Tertiary education employment 0.4858 0.4400 -0.7199 0.2284 0 
Life-long-learning ratio 0.4556 0.5702 0.6795 0.0746 0 
Total R&D expenditure 0.5648 -0.2976 -0.0446 -0.7684 0 






Table A4. The drivers of growth – levels and change – at a regional level in the EU (1999-2013). 
System-GMM analysis. 
   System-GMM analysis  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Initial GDP per capita -0.047*** -0.052*** -0.048*** -0.040*** -0.045*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Investment 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009** 0.013*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Population growth -0.248 -0.277 -0.400* -0.348* -0.314 
 
(0.217) (0.227) (0.237) (0.211) (0.216) 
Agglomeration 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.010** 0.010*** 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Level of accessibility index -0.005 -0.002 -0.0012 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.0041) (0.004) (0.004) 
Change of accessibility index -0.219** -0.165 -0.214* -0.238** -0.218* 
 
(0.110) (0.112) (0.118) (0.111) (0.112) 
Level of human capital & innovation index 0.010 0.008 0.011* 0.016*** 0.0150*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Change of human capital & innovation index -0.070*** -0.050** -0.060*** -0.072*** -0.049** 
 
(0.026) (0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Level of institutional quality (QoG) 0.043 
    
 
(0.035) 
    
Change of institutional quality (QoG) 0.384*** 
    
 
(0.133) 
    
Institutional index components      
   Level of corruption index 
 
0.062* 
   
  
(0.036) 
   
   Change of corruption index 
 
0.135* 
   
  
(0.072) 
   




   
(0.030) 
  




   
(0.0997) 
  
   Level of government effectiveness 
   
0.007 
 
    
(0.026) 
 
   Change of government effectiveness 
   
0.279*** 
 
    
(0.053) 
 
   Level of government accountability 
    
0.018 
     
(0.026) 
   Change of government accountability 
    
0.317*** 
     
(0.068) 
Observations 2,802 2,802 2,802 2,801 2,802 
Number of NUTS-2 regions 249 249 249 249 249 
Number of instruments 286 286 286 289 286 
AR (2) test statistic (p-value) 0.205 0.385 0.865 0.280 0.248 
AR (3) test statistic (p-value) 0.112 0.129 0.275 0.221 0.0585 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.764 0.267 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: *,**,*** illustrate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% , respectively. The standard errors are listed in parentheses. 
Investment is proxied by regional gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP. All independent variables are 
included with a one year lag. Natural logarithms have been taken for most regressors apart from the population growth 
variable. The GMM calculations were done using the first-step version of xtabond2 by Roodman (2009). All regressions 
include constant time dummies. 
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